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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 16036 
ALLPHIN REALTY, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WESLEY F. SINE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Suit by real estate broker for commission claimed to be 
owed where conditional offer was presented which was not 
accepted and property was not sold. The agreement between 
the parties provided for payment of a commission only if the 
property were in fact sold. The listing agreement did not 
contain the offering price or the terms of the proposed 
sale. The listing contract was drafted by the real estate 
broker. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge Winder granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment of dismissal for failure to state a claim for 
relief upon which relief can be granted since conditions 
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precedent to the broker being entitled to recover a commis-
sion had not occurred and since the listing contract did not 
satisfy the minimum requirements of the Utah Statute of 
Frauds (25-5-4(5), UCA, 1953). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmation of the summary judgment of dismissal with 
prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 13, 1976, plaintiff's assignor and defendant 
entered into an agreement which is the subject natter of 
this lawsuit, which agreement read in part as follows: 
"AGREEMENT OF COMMISSION 
"I Wesley F. Sine, agree to pay a com-
mission of $60,000.00 minimum to Owner 
Realty Corp. if the New House Hotel is 
sold to any of the persons listed below 
or to their associates which is through 
the efforts of Owner Corp. Realty, 
either directly or indirectly." [Empha-
sis added.] 
About May 7, 1977, plaintiff presented an offer (R. 44) 
which was not accepted by buyer. The transaction proposed 
by the offer was never consumated and the hotel was not sold 
to any of the persons listed in the commission agreement. 
(See affidavit of Wesley Sine, R. 49-50, and plaintiff's 
answer to request for admission #17, R. 39). 
No earnest money was paid in connection with that offer 
-2-
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(see notation in upper-right corner of offer R. 44) and 
affidavit of Wesley F. Sine-R. 49, ~ 9). That offer was 
subject to: 
.inspection of the hotel and accep-
tance by the buyer," and 
"Subject to Buyers physical 
of Sellers books verifying a 
gross business for the Hotel 




No unconditional offer of purchase which could ripen into a 
contract if accepted was presented to Sine, the only offer 
being that contained in the instrument of May 7, 1977 (R. 
44. See also affidavit of Sine, R. 49-50). 
The "Agreement of Commission" mentioned on page 2 above 
was drafted by plaintiff. See finding contained in Summary 
Judgment (R. 63). It is suggested that the Court read the 9 
page transcript of the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment (a copy of which is duplicated in the appendix 
attached hereto, R. 69-76) so that the reasoning of Judge 




THE LISTING CONTRACT IS INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF THE UTAH STATUTE OF FRAUDS RE REAL ESTATE BROKERS 
The listing contract (R. 43, quoted on page 2 above) is 
insufficient to satisfy the minimum requirements of the Utah 
Statute of Frauds because it fails to specify the price or 
-3-
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terms for which the hotel was to be offered for sale. The 
Court expressly found that the listing contract was insuf-
ficient (R. 63-64) in its summary judgment, wherein the 
Court stated in part as follows: 
•. Court concluded that the October 
13, 1976, writing (exhibit "A"), among 
other things, did not contain the con-
templated sales price and therefore was 
not a sufficient memorandum to satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds; and further, that 
because of said defect parol evidence 
would not be admissable to furnish the 
necessary terms of the agreement; " 
See also discussion between counsel and the Court found in 
the 9 page transcript of the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment (R. 69-76). (See also attached appendix). 
Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to be paid a 
commission because it allegedly "produced a buyer, ready, 
willing, and able to purchase the real property . 
(R. 53, , 4). That listing agreement differs from the usual 
listing agreement in that it contained no provisions for the 
payment of a commission if the broker produced a buyer who 
was "ready, willing and able to purchase," but instead 
expressly limits the obligation to pay a commission to the 
actual sale of the hotel. 
Counsel for plaintiff has quoted extensively from 
general statements found in Am. Jur. and from other states 
which have little significance in applying the Utah Statute. 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Ney v. Harrison, 299 
-4-
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P.2d 1114, 5 U. (2d) 217, the "decisions of courts have 
varied widely as to the sufficiency of writings which will 
suffice to meet the Statute of Frauds." These cases from 
other states quoted by plaintiff are of little help in 
determining the sufficiency of the contract involved in this 
case. 
Counsel for plaintiff apparently relies primarily upon 
three Utah cases, none of which appear to support plain-
tiff's claims. Those cases, and other Utah cases pertaining 
to the issues in this case are discussed as follows: 
On Page 4 of its brief plaintiff discusses Ney v. Har-
rison, 5 U. (2d) 217, 299 P.2d 1114, as standing for the 
proposition that the contract itself need not be in writing 
if there is a sufficient written note or memorandum of that 
contract. We have no quarrel with that proposition, however 
the real issue is whether or not the listing contract is a 
sufficient writing under the statute of frauds. On page 
5(c) of plaintiff's brief plaintiff's attorney quotes from 
Restatement of Contracts, § 207 (quoted by the Court in 
Ney v. Harrison, supra) the requirement that the: 
"writing" must "state[s] with reasonable 
certainty, 
"(a) 
"(b) • • • 
"(c) the terms and conditions of 
all the promises constituting the con-
tract and by whom and to whom the pro-
mises are made." [Emphasis added] 
In Ney v. Harrison the Court was dealing with an earnest 
-5-
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money receipt contract which had been signed by the seller 
which contained the selling price and terms of sale (unlike 
our case where the listing agreement contained no price or 
terms and the earnest money receipt was not signed by the 
proposed seller) . 
On page 5 of plaintiff's brief counsel quotes from 
Fritsch v. Hess, 49 U. 75, 162 P. 70 concerning the neces-
sary elements of a writing to entitle a broker to recover a 
commission, however that case also supports to position of 
defendant that the writing in our case is insufficient since 
the listing contract in our case does not contain the mini-
mum requirements to satisfy the Utah Statute of Frauds. In 
that case the Court stated in part as follows: 
" ••. writing must contain the essential 
elements of the contract so that they 
may be ascertained from the writing 
without a resort to oral evidence 
" ••• a broker ... may recover com-
pensation for his services when a cus-
tomer has been procured by him who is 
able, willing and ready to purchase upon 
the terms named by the seller. 
On page 8 of plaintiff's brief counsel quotes froQ Case 
v. Ralph, 56 U. 243, 188 P. 640 as allegedly standing for 
the proposition that the terms of sale need not be stated in 
-6-
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the writing to 
Statute of Frauds. 
satisfy the requirements of the Utah 
In that case a written coDmission 
agreement executed after services had been performed in 
procuring a purchaser for Dining claims was held to be 
insufficient to 
Statute of Frauds 
satisfy the requirements 





pursuant to a contract authorizing the broker to sell the 
Dining claims. In that case the claiDs had been sold for 
a specific price and the Court did not decide whether or 
not the sales price need be stated to entitle the broker 
to a commission. The written agreeDent for payoent of the 
commission was held to be insufficient to entitle the 
Broker to recover unless the services were performed 
pursuant to a contract authorizing the broker to sell the 
mining claims. 
Since plaintiff drafted the listing contract it must be 
construed most strongly against him, Barnard v. Hardy, 77 U. 
218, 293 P. 12; Smith v. Burton, 4 U. (2d) 61, 286 P.2d 806; 
Real Estate Exchange v. Kingston, 18 U. (2d) 254, 420 P.2d 
1 17; Olsen v. Kidman, 120 U. 443, 235 P.2d 510. Plaintiff 
-7-
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chose to use a listing contract which he drafted himself 
instead of using the standard listing agreement and is 
strictly bound by its terms and conditions. The agreement 
prepared by plaintiff contained no language requiring pay-
ment of a commission upon procuring a ready, willing and 
able buyer, but instead required that the property be "sold" 
before he became entitled to a commission. In Watson v. 
Odell, the broker was denied a commission since the contract 
between the broker and his principal required the approval 
of the purchaser's attorney, and the attorney refused to 
give that approval. In our case defendant was unwilling to 
accept the earnest money subject to the conditions con-
tained in the offer. In Wicks v. Moyle, 103 U. 554, 137 
P.2d 342, the Court quoted with approval from Restatement of 
Agency §447: 
"A broker is never entitled to commis-
sions for unsuccessful efforts. The 
risk of a failure is wholly his. The 
reward comes only with success. That is 
the plain contract and contemplation of 
the parties. The broker may devote his 
time and labor, and expend his money 
with ever so much devotion to the inter-
ests of his employer, and yet if he 
fails, if without effecting an agreement 
or accomplishing a bargain, he abandons 
the effort, or his authority is fairly 
and in good faith terminated, he gains 
no right to commissions." 
In that case the Utah Court also stated: 
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he procures a purchaser who is ready, 
willing, and able to buy, or when he 
brings a buyer and seller together who 
make a bargain on different terms than 
those theretofore dictated to the agent, 
does not apply when the agent's commis-
sion is governed by a spec~al contract 
between him and his princiflal," citing 
Watson v. Odell, 58 U. 27 , 198 P. 772. 
[Emphasis added]. 
In that case the broker was denied compensation under the 
terms of his special employment contract even though the 
parties made a contract which benefited his principal be-
cause that contract was on different or modified terms from 
that required under the terms of his special contract. 
In Lewis v. Dahle, 108 U. 486, 161 P.2d 362, the Court 
denied recovery to a broker under a listing contract which 
required the owner to pay a commission if he sold his prop-
erty during the listing period where the "sale" in fact was 
closed after the listing had expired. The Court stated in 
part as follows: 
"Until the owner receives a written 
offer or a written acceptance which he 
can enforce as a valid and bindin~ 
contract, or unt~l there ~s a sale Wh~c 
is recognized by the statute of frauds, 
there is no sale within the meaning of 
the above quoted prov~s~on in the bro-
ker's listing contract." [Emphasis 
added]. 
Since the offer presented by plaintiff was subject to the 
buyer's "approval" and to other conditions precedent there 
was no unconditional offer in fact presented by plaintiff 
-9-
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which defendant could have accepted and which could have 
been enforced by defendant as a "binding contract" within 
the meaning of Lewis v. Dahle, supra. Accordingly, plain-
tiff made no sale and is not entitled to a commission. See 
also Sproul v. Parks, 116 U. 368, 210 P.2d 436. 
The Court will not make a new contract for the parties 
but will enforce the terms of their contract. Curtis v. 
Mortensen, U. (2d) 354, 267 P.2d 237; Real Estate Exchange 
v. Kingston, 18 U. (2d) 254, 420 P.2d 117, (broker entitled 
to be paid commission from payments as received was not 
entitled to further payment after default by buyer); Lynn v. 
K.C. Ranches, Inc., 19 U. (2d) 3, 425 P.2d 403, (no commis-
sion payable where listing which called for cash down pay-
ment and offer of land in exchange was rejected even though 
offered price was higher than listing price). Equitable 
Realty, Inc. v. Nielson, 30 U. (2d) 433, 519 P.2d 243 (com-
mission denied where option was not exercised according to 
terms since conditions precedent to right to recover did not 
occur); Weaver v. Modula, 557 P.2d 152 (commission denied 
where willing qualified buyer was procured who was unable to 
obtain financing because of unavailability of mortgage 
money); Boyer Company v. Lingnell, 567 P.2d 1112, (1977), 
(broker is denied commission until he has a written binding 
offer or agreement signed by a ready, willing and able 
purchaser; which means that all the terms and conditions 
-10-
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must be agreed upon between the parties). Plaintiff is, in 
essence, asking the Court to make a new contract which would 
entitle it to recover a commission without the hotel being 
sold, since admittedly the hotel was not sold as required 
under the terms of the contract between the parties. 
The Am. Jur. citations quoted by counsel for plaintiff 
in his brief support defendant's position since they stand 
for the proposition that the terms and conditions of the 
contract be included in the listing agreement to satisfy the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The quotations on 
page 5 of plaintiff's brief from Ney v. Harrison, 5 U. (2d) 
217, 299 P.2d 1114 and Fritsch v. Hess, 49 U. 75, 162 P. 70 
also contain the requirement that the "essential terms of a 
contract" be included and that "the terms and conditions of 
all the promises constituting the contract" be included in 
writing, which is not present in our case since the price 
and terms of the proposed sale are omitted from the listing 
contract. The citation on page 6 of plaintiff's brief to 12 
Am. Jur. 2d 806 §45 also supports defendant's position 
since it states that a listing contract must "state the 
price to be obtained or any other of the terms and details 
of a sale which may be required to be embodied in a contract 
for the sale of the property," and that the price and terms 
"may not be inferred from mere expression of the owner" 
-11-
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concerning a price that he might be willing to accept. 
Plaintiff has also quoted from 80 ALR 1472 in support 
of its assertion that the writing is sufficient without the 
sales price being specified, however those citations do not 
support plaintiff's claims under the facts of this case. 
The quotation on page 6 deals with a contract which obli-
gated the seller to pay as commission all over a designated 
price per acre (which fixed a selling price to the land 
owner), however no such price to seller is mentioned in our 
contract. On page 7 of plaintiff's brief the case of Green-
berg v. Sakwinski, 211 Mich. 498, 179 N.W. 234, is cited by 
plaintiff, however that case was a situation where (unlike 
our case) the broker's right to a commission was contingent 
upon the owner's acceptance of a price and terms acceptable 
to him and the owner had in fact signed a contract for the 
sale of the land. Plaintiff also quotes from Badger v. Fin-
layson, 219 Mich. 660, 189 N.W. 988, where the court held 
that the omission of the sale price was immaterial where the 
property was in fact sold (which is not true in our case) . 
The case of Henderson v. Lemke, 60 Or. 363, 119 P. 482 
quoted on page 7 of plaintiff's brief also deals with a 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S COMMISSION IS BARRED 
FOR FAILURE OF CONDITIONS PRECEDENT 
Under the specific terms of the listing contract (R. 
43) quoted on page 2 above, plaintiff is not entitled to be 
paid a commission unless the hotel "is sold." The hotel was 
not sold. The usual listing contract provisions for payment 
of a commission when a ready, willing and able buyer is 
produced who offers to buy on terms stated in the usual 
listing contract are not present in this case. No terms or 
prices are found in the listing contract. It would be 
impossible for the plaintiff to produce a ready, willing and 
able buyer who was willing to buy on the terms and for the 
price stated in the listing contract since that contract 
contains no terms or price. The Court cannot enlarge the 
terms of the contract or create new provisions in contracts 
to protect brokers who have allegedly performed some ser-
vices which would have entitled the broker to a commission 
had the contract so provided. If the contract does not 
provide for payment of a commission under the facts then the 
broker cannot recover a commission. Miffin v. Shiki, 77 U. 
190, 292 P. 1; Barnard v. Hardy, 77 U. 218, 293 P. 12. A 
broker must allege and prove an express contract of employ-
ment which entitled him to recover the compensation agreed 
upon. Smith Realtv Co. v. Dipietro, 7 U. 176, 292 P. 915. 
-13-
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The terms and conditions upon which the commission was to be 
paid must appear from the contract alleged. Case v. Ralph, 
56 U. 243, 188 P. 640. A broker can recover only by virtue 
of the contract and cannot recover as upon quantum meruit. 
Watson v. Odell, 58 U. 276, 198 P. 772. 
No unconditional offer to purchase was ever presented 
by plaintiff. The only offer presented (R. 44) was by its 
terms subject to several conditions precedent and accord-
ingly could not have been accepted so as to ripen into a 
binding contract. For example, no earnest money would be 
paid until the offer was accepted (see note in upper-right 
margin of offer); the offer was "subject to inspection of 
the hotel and acceptance of same •.• by buyer" (see note 
in left margin of offer); and was "subject to Buyers physi-
cal inspection of Sellers books verifying a $600,000.00 
gross business from the Hotel New House in the year 1976," 
and contained a provision that buyer could "have sellers 
books audited if buyer so desires." It is difficult to 
understand how plaintiff can claim to be entitled to a 
commission on an offer containing those conditions prece-
dent, which offer was unacceptable to seller and was not 
accepted. (See affidavit of Sine, R. 49-50, H 7, 8 and 9). 
All of the terms and conditions imposed by the contract must 
be met before there is any right to a commission. Even had 
the seller listed the property for sale for the price men-
-14-
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tioned in the offer (which seller did not do) since the 
offer varied from those terms by reason of the conditions of 
the offer (mentioned above) , plaintiff would still not be 
entitled to a commission. See 18 ALR2d 376; 169 ALR 380; Am 
Jur 2d, Brokers §§185-187. The terms of the contract 
required completion of the sale as a condition precedent to 
earning a commission. See Watson v. Odell, 58 U. 276, 198 
P. 772, 20 ALR 280; Am Jur 2d, Brokers §§195, 196. 
The reason for the requirement of a writing before a 
real estate broker can recover a commission is to protect 
land owners from imposition of spurious claims by real 
estate brokers for commissions. Nay v. Harrison, 5 U. (2d) 
217, 299 P.2d 1114; Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205. This 
case is a classic example of a fictitious claim for a real 
estate commission which was not earned and is not owed. The 
social prupose for which the statute was enacted will be 
promoted by affirming the summary judgment of dismissal by 
the lower Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly granted summary judgment 
dismissing plaintiff's claim for a real estate commission 
since the listing agreement omitted the price and terms of 
sale which were necessary for that agreement to meet the 
minimum standards of the Utah Statute of Frauds, 25-5-4(5), 
-15-
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UCA, 1953; since under the agreement no commission was 
payable unless the property was sold and the property was 
not in fact sold; and since the offer presented by the 
broker was subject to substantial conditions precedent and 
would not have ripened into a binding contract of sale had 
the seller accepted that conditional offer (which did not 
bind the buyer to purchase the property). The decision of 
the lower court dismissing plaintiff's complaint should be 
affirmed. 
Dated the LjjJ'- day of January, 1979. 
I hereby certify that I caused two copiesp,f the fore-
going to be mailed, postage prepaid, the~ day of Jan-
uary, 1979, to Robert E. Froerer, attorney for plaintiff, P. 
0. Box 107, Ogden, Utah 84402. 
') /~ ;7 /. /.:· / ----~L-~ L 
~onald C. Barker 
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I"," T~-IT: DIS':"RIC':' COr!RT GF THE ~HIRD JUDICIAL DIS~RIC~ 
I:-1 l\111) F0P SA!!" L2\Y.E COUNTY 1 S'"ATE OF U':'AH 
ALLP:l:I'T REJI_L':::'Y r1c., fomerly 
known as OWNER REALTY CORP. , 
Plainti"f, 
vs 
~'lESLEY F. SINE I 
Defendant. 
-ooo-
Civil No. 244884 
REPORTER 1 S TRANSCRIPT 
BE IT REME~'!BERED that on v7ednesday, Hay 10, 1978, 
at the hour of 10:45 A.11., the above-entitled cause came on 
regularly for hearing before the rronoarable David K. Winder, 
Judge of the District Court, Third Judicial District, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah and the following matters 
were heard. 
liPPEARA!JCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
FII.!O IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
S•lt Lake County, U+•h 
AUG 2! 1978 
ROBERT B. FROERER 
Attorney at Law 
2610 Washington Blvd. 
P. o. Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Tel: 399-3303 
RONALD C. BARKER 
!'l.ttorney at La>v 
237(} South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34115 
Tel: 486-9636 
29 W. s"'u.., a. ..... elM 1 ... Olol. c.-; 
jQ 8y .t ,· I! I l-{1 ~~~ 0 r.d. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
I 
5 Wesley P. Si~e, 2~J~3~. ''or. Rob er-e "' 
f) I 
representing the plclinti<:f and ~·r. ".on C. Barker is reoresent-i 
ing the ~efendant. 
~~. "'roerer, ! have been throu.,h the :"ile :naterials 
9 and read then, rs there any oth2r docunent that you rely 
10 on as far as a written agreement from Mr. Sine to pay a 
11 co~~ission other than that one a~reement that is attached, 
12 I think, to your 
13 
14 
11~. '!"~OE'U:R: That is the memorandum that we rely on. 
':'HE COUR":': The 7\qreernent of Cot:lr:'lission, I:xhibit A? 
15 Do you claim the prooerty was sold? 
16 MR. FRO!:P.B": !-To. I called Mr. Barke:r. up yesterday to 
17 perhaps delay this because I had the wrong date on this 
18 hearing. I wanted to file this coun~er--
19 MR. BA~'t{EP: He have no objection to his filing an 
20 affidavit. 
21 MR. T>'!l.O:CRFR: Basically, our position, Your !!onor, is 
22 that if you turn to page 4, I believe it is, of ::ty !~emorandum 
23 of Points and Authorities, in Hoyt v. Nasatch Homes, 263 Pac. 
24 2d 927, our court has said, "That agreement--" In referring 
25 to a situation in which a seller has refused to cooperate in 
26 the sale of a property, "That agreement certainly contemplated! 
21 that the plaintiff lvould cocoerate in good faith tmvard the 
ZH acconplishm~nt of the pur:::>oses for lofhich he employed the 
29 cl~fendant. :!" cannot 'C>e oe!"T'1i tten to procure them to obtain 
lu a buyer, on terms acceoted 'Jy t~e CJlain tiff, and then prevent 
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an accomolishl"ent of ,,.,hat he rern.:est2d and authorized the1:1 
to do for ar~itr:~rily ref·-.:sin(l' tc ..,erfor1:1 his p3rt o: the 
:3 transaction. l!nder such ::i:ccu1:1sta.nces, ;.,~ •.1111 not h"! heard 
4 to com?lain of th8ir fail•Ar"! to do t-_>Bt ,,,h:.ch !"le prevented." 
5 I:1 tJ-.is case, the court allo<·Jed the co=ission • 
6 .l\lso i::~ Curtis v. 1·lorter.sen, 267 "ac. 2d 237, 
7 "The sale was never consurranated because respondents changed 
8 their mind and refused to sell and not because the buyers 
9 refused to make a binding a0reement." 
10 THE COUR":': J'..rP.rlt these under the standard 1 isting 
11 ;~greement tyl_')e of situation? I mean, <vho drafted this 
12 Exhibit A? Do you know, )~r. ::"roerer? 
13 1·1R. F~OERRR: I am not sure whether my client did or 
14 •.vhether it ~-o•as in coooeration. I am going to assur.~e my 
15 client did. 
16 THE COURT: I can certainly understand the usual 
17 listing agreement where, if you find a buyer who is ready, 
18 willing and able on the terMs set forth herein and then the 
19 seller just says, "~To, I a.":! not going to sell." But that 
20 isn't this case because whoever drafted this got themselves 
21 stuck 1<1i th, "if. the NeNhouse Hotel is sold to any of the 
22 Persons listed belo~>l ••• " 
23 .l\nother Problem you have got is that the person 
24 •.,rho signed it -- and maybe this is an inadvertance, but 
25 James R. Cooney isn't even on that list. 
26 MR. FROBRER: "Or associates." ~e is a brother of 
27 Mike Cooney. 
28 THE COURT: "Or to their associates." '·7ell, tl:lere is 
29 no evidence of that in the :':ile, is there? 
30 MP.. l"P.OT:RER: I think that is a cruestion of :act. 
4 
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':''fS COliR.":': I agree ~rit!1 that. 
2 ~~~. r."PJJ:r.:RZ~: ! ~r-.ir..k ·.ve ::a"Te a question o-: fact here 
whether they re~used to c~oryerate. T t~ink we are entitle~ 
-- granted, vour ~onor, this is not the tycical printed 
5 listinq agreeMent, much to !"'1'! d.ismay. But on the other hand, 
6 they had an aqreement. >·7e have memorandur:1 of an agreement 
7 and our position is that the sale '"ould have been consummated 
8 on terms in excess o~ Nhat they ·o~anted h'l.d they cooperated. 
9 They refused to cooperate and I think their refusal entitles 
10 us to a commission. 
11 T'ill COURT: :~ell, another insuperable problem you have 
12 got is that there is no mention of a price in any written 
13 thing. How can you possibly get a connission or pursue your 
14 theory when Sine has never agreed to pay a co~mission. ~nd 
15 if he had said, if the ~lewhouse Hotel is sold for $1,200,000 
16 or more. But you have got an absolutely essential term of 
17 this thing that is left to oral negotiation. 
18 HR. F:ROEREP.: I think this agreeMent is vague and 
19 uncertain and I think we can prove by parole evidence what 
20 the sale price 'H'as, \vhat the commission was, and what the 
21 terms Nere to be. 
22 Tlill COURT: Sut as you well know, 25-5-4, Subsection 5 
23 says that an agreement to pay a compensation to a real 
24 estate agent or a broker has got to he in writing. 
25 !1R, FROERI:R: Our position is, we have a r.~emorandum in 
26 1.;ri ting and I think the Utah la•H' and the la1.; generally will 
27 allow parole evidence to add to +:he terms 1-rhere they are 
28 uncertai~, vague or there is some aMbiguity in the agreeMent. 
29 '"'e have the 1~ritten agreement. I think that coMnlies with 
30 the statute. Whether we can oroduce the total evidence to 
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right to a trial t0 ~av2 ~e~rd. 
'C'TTI: COUR'!': 'Jut acrai~, I i!Cl re:->r;a-ci:-~cr ~ysP.lf 'JU~, ··ll'ere 
you don't have that sal~ ~rice, ! iust can't conceive o~ 
getting around th,it hecause Sine sajs, "I clidn' t ·.1ant ':0 sell 
"or $1,200,0110. 
doesn't want to. All he has agreed tc do is, if the thin0 
is sold to one of these neople or their associates. And it 
hasn't heen sold. 
1~R. F'RO:':"<ER: Sine agreed, according to t!-Je af:':idavit 
I have of my client attached to this menorandum, he agreed to 
sell for $1 million olus commission. This sale would have 
netted him $140 thousand in excess of what he wanted for the 
















THE COURT: But you can't do that, in my jud<J111ent, by 
?arole evidence. 
!~R. FROERER: I think you can do that by parole 
evidence. 
How, Sine is not the nr=rson -- the ordinary 
seller, perhaps the unsophisticated seller. 
Sine has a law degree. 
I understand 
THE COURT: I kno•~ of him and I assume that. 
r.t.R. FR0EREP.: I think if ar.ybody •.Hs ::~isled or taken 
advantacre of, it •.-.'as my client and not 11r. Sine. 
'!'!m COUP.':': ":'hat is unfortunate. 
~1R. FROERER: I think He CO:'!'nly ""i ~h the statutes of 
fraud. \le have a De!!lorandum in writing. '!'he la\·T doesn't 
say -- 25-5-4 does not say specifically what has to be in 
30 that memorandum. I think •.vP. arP. entitled to nresent, U?On 
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I ' the ~asis of that ~emoranduM an~ on the ~asis of the Utah 
2 lav;, oarole "!'lidence to ·~stahlish or to clear up sone of the 
a.rnbiqui t?. 3 
-l T'IE COUR':": '1r. Proerer, I uill tell you one thing t!"lat 
.5 has got to he in t!"lere is the nrice. ! am as confident of 
6 that as I can be of anything, that you can't hold sonebody 
7 to pay a coMI!lission if y(")u don't evP.n state the price that 
it is going to be sold for. I mean, that would just make a 8 
9 mockery of a written agreement. All you need to do is just 
10 sian your naMe on a piece of naper and give it to somebody 
11 and thev v;ould "I •.vill SUO!Jly the rest of the terms. " say, 
12 But if you don't have the price -- now, the col!'nission is 
13 here. But it is a fatal flali that the price isn't in there 
14 because that is the key thing. 
15 '·low, '"'hether you can suooly -- •.vhether it is to 
16 be paid over a oeriod of time, the interest rate, I am not 
17 rulinq on that, but I am as sure as I can be that the nrice 
18 has to be in there. 
19 MR. FROERFR: I kno•-1 of no case. I have seen no case 
20 in my extensive research, in any case lvhere it says there 
21 has to be a price in the Hritten aqreer.1ent. Our position is 
22 that 1-1e can establish t.'1e nrice by "Jarole evidence. 
23 ~·low, if v;e don 1 t have the parole evidence to 
2-l establish i'l price, I •,;ould have to agree •.vi t':1 you. But if 11e 
25 can get parole evidence to establish the price to the 
26 satisfaction of the tryer of fact, I think we have an 
27 ~crreemen t. 
:28 ':'H:C COUR':': You wouldn't have any case that 1vent to 
:29 i'l lnHsuit where you lvoulc1n't have parole evidence to satisfy 
~ that or it Houldn't have qot to a la~suit. You would have 
7.- . 
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somebocy claiming that. 
2 MR. FROI'"J:R: It is a nuestion of •,;hetl1er '"e have a 
3 
sufficient or~?cn~erance of the evicence to establish the 
4 price. But ! know of no case. I have seen no case in this 
5 
area of law or any lnw -- of conrse, I have !Bven' t chec~ed 
6 
out all areas of la1>1, obviously -- that says the r:;enorandun 
7 
has to say a-h-e-d-e-f. 
8 
Tl!E COURT: Hell, ! am not saying that it has got to 
9 
say b through f, but it has got to have the orice, in my 
10 iudgrnent. 
11 MR. F~OERER: I know of no case that says that. 
12 THE COURT: I understand, Mr. ::'roerer. You are doing 
13 
the best you can with Hhat you have got, but yt"Ju have got 
14 the word "sold" in here. You acknowledge that probably, you 




-- you don't say flatly and I an sure you probably don't know 
17 
would be construed against him. 
18 
MR. FROP.RER: I an not positive, but I think he did. 
19 
THE COURT: You have got "sold 0 in there. So even if 
20 
you got beyond what I just ruled, that the price has got to 
21 be in there. I think the nrobabilities would be that Sine 
22 
could t)Ossibly just turn it do'= and if it '>~eren't sold 
23 
period, but he 1-rouldn 1 t '1ave to pay. But certainly, •,;here 
24 
that price isn't in there --
25 
11R. F'ROP.RER: I think the Utah cases, Your '-loner, 
26 
where clearly t.!1ese t1.ro cases are not too old, where the 
27 
seller refused to coooerate -- I think that is a moot ooint. 
28 T!1E COURT: But ~1r. '"roerer, in t!:lose cases, there is 
29 
an agreement of the tyne -- the usual listing agreement. I 
30 
am sure I have read those back along the line, but that is a 
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situation where everything has been none that the persor~ 
agreed to pay a co1Tl1'1ission for and then wouldn't go through 
with it. Isn't that what those cases are? Jn other worcls, 
!"le says --
~1R. PPOJ.~ER: 
about the other. 
I thin~ one of then is. I am not surf' 
THE COURT: Thnt is a completely ctiffcrent case than 
this, in 1!1}' judgr-,ent. I hnvc to agree '~i th those. 
But My rul]nq is that when' the amount o! the 
nrice isn't in writing, that it is not enforceable and, 
accordingly, I am gninq to qr2nt the dcfenda~t's motion for 
sUMMary judgment. 
Thank you, gentlemen. 
MR. F'ROERrP: I Hould like to haw~ this typed un in an 
order for aonelant purposes. 
TIU: COURT: That is fine. 
MR. BARI:F.R: If you \<mulrl like ne to, I will fon,•arc1 it 
to your ~or your ann:o:-ov~l as to form. 
-ooo-
ss. 
COlT TTY nF' Sl> LT Ll\!:F 
I, ShirlPvan Hennerson, a CPrti~i<'n Shorthanr' 
Reporter, License 'lo. (; 7 for th<" Stat'' of Uti'lh, do l:"lereb~· 
certify tl:"lat 1 rr-nGr~,..d the nroce,.,~]ng~ in the ahove-
er.ti tlecl Matter 0'1 t:l'P lflth r1?" o~ ~lay, 197!1, he fore t!"le 
~''inclP:-, a!'d the ron?rroing transcrint 
consisting of g pages constitutes a true and correct 
nartial tra~scrint o~ the nrncccdin~s held. 
I!l >-li':"''l"SS I!EI''lTnr, r havr hPreunto set mv ha'1r; 
an< 1 seal this 2r;th -ia•J of ,Tuly, 1978. 
s 
h''f c;__: •;.,\~c\r:, c': ?.:, r::. 1;, 1?7' •'9., 
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